Multiple Long-Run Equilibria in a Free-Entry Mixed Oligopoly by Haraguchi, Junichi & Matsumura, Toshihiro
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Multiple Long-Run Equilibria in a
Free-Entry Mixed Oligopoly
Junichi Haraguchi and Toshihiro Matsumura
14 May 2018
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/86704/
MPRA Paper No. 86704, posted 18 May 2018 13:36 UTC
Multiple Long-Run Equilibria in a Free-Entry Mixed Oligopoly∗
Junichi Haraguchi† and Toshihiro Matsumura‡
May 16, 2018
Abstract
We investigate a free-entry mixed oligopoly with constant marginal costs. A privatization
policy is implemented after private firms enter the market. We find that both full privatization
and full nationalization are equilibrium policies, and the former is the worst privatization policy
for welfare.
JEL classification numbers: D43, H44, L33
Key words: entry-then-privatization, constant marginal costs, profit-enhancing entry, two polar
equilibrium privatization policies
∗We are grateful to Hong Hwang, Akifumi Ishihara, Hirokazu Ishise, Kuo-Feng Kuo, Noriaki Matsushima, Masaki
Nakabayashi, Cong Pan, Cheng-Hau Peng, Naoki Wakamori, and the participants of seminars at National Taiwan
University, Shinshu University and The University of Tokyo for their helpful comments and suggestions. We ac-
knowledge financial support from JSPS KAKENHI (Grant Number 18K01500). Any errors are our own.
†Corresponding author: Faculty of Economics, Kanagawa University, 3-27-1, Rokkakubashi, Kanagawa-ku, Yoko-
hama, Kanagawa, 221-8686, Japan. Phone:(81)-45-481-5661. E-mail:jyunichi.haraguchi@gmail.com
‡Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo, 7-3-1, Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-0033, Japan.
Phone:(81)-3-5841-4932. Fax:(81)-3-5841-4905. E-mail:matsumur@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp
1
Highlights
A free entry mixed oligopoly with constant marginal costs is examined.
The government chooses the degree of privatization after private firms’ entries.
Firms’ profits can increase with the new entry of a private firm.
Two polar policies, full privatization and nationalization, are equilibrium policies.
Full privatization is the worst policy for welfare.
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1 Introduction
For more than 50 years, we observe a worldwide wave of privatization of state-owned public enter-
prises. Nevertheless, many public enterprises with significant government ownership remain active
in strategic sectors and control large portions of the world’s resources. According to an OECD re-
port by Kowalski et al. (2013), over 10% of the 2,000 largest companies are public enterprises, with
sales equivalent to approximately 6% of worldwide GDP. They are significant players in sectors
such as transportation, telecommunications, energy, and finance in OECD countries. In planned
and transitional countries, the presence of public enterprises is of further significance.
One classical rationale for public enterprises is to prevent private monopolies in natural monop-
olies where significant economies of scale are prevalent. Thus, many public enterprises existed or
still exist in such national monopoly markets.1 However, due to technological improvement, many
markets that contain public enterprises are not always characterized by significant economies of
scale. Indeed, a considerable number of public enterprises compete with private enterprises in a
wide range of industries (mixed oligopolies).2 The optimal privatization policies in these mixed
oligopolies attracted extensive attention from economics researchers in such fields as industrial
organization, public economics, financial economics, and development economics.3
Recent deregulation and liberalization significantly weakened entry restrictions in mixed oligopolies.
Thus, private enterprises recently entered many mixed oligopolies such in the banking, insurance,
telecommunications, energy, and transportation industries. The literature on mixed oligopolies
contains many studies on optimal privatization policy in free entry markets. Matsumura and Kanda
(2005) adopt Matsumura’s (1998) partial privatization approach and show that the optimal degree
of privatization is zero when private competitors are domestic, while Cato and Matsumura (2012)
show that it is strictly positive when private competitors are foreign and that this is increasing
1Nippon Telecom and Telecommunication (NTT) and Kokusai Denshin Denwa (KDD) are typical examples of
public monopolists. These firms were monopolies until 1985.
2Examples include the United States Postal Service, Deutsche Post AG, Areva, NTT, Japan Tobacco (JT),
Volkswagen, Renault, Electricite de France, Japan Postal Bank, Kampo, Korea Development Bank, and the Korea
Investment Corporation.
3For examples of mixed oligopolies and recent developments in this field, see Colombo (2016), Chen (2017), Ishida
and Matsushima (2009), and the works cited therein.
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in the foreign ownership share in private firms. Chen (2017) revisits the problem by introducing
the cost-reducing effect of privatization. Fujiwara (2007) find a non-monotonic (monotonic) re-
lationship between the degree of product differentiation and optimal degree of privatization in a
non-free-entry (free-entry) market. Cato and Matsumura (2015) discuss the relationship between
optimal trade and privatization policies and show that a higher tariff rate reduces the optimal
degree of privatization, and that the optimal tariff rate can be negative. Cato and Matsumura
(2013) demonstrate the privatization neutrality theorem.4
These studies assume that the government chooses its privatization policies before private en-
terprises enter the market (privatization-then-entry model). Lee et al. (2018) adopt an alternative
time line by formulating a model in which the government implements a privatization policy af-
ter private firms enter the market (entry-then-privatization model) and compare the equilibrium
privatization policy with that of the privatization-then-entry model. They find that the entry-then-
privatization model yields inefficient partial privatization. The privatization-then-entry model im-
plicitly assumes that the government can commit to a privatization policy (can commit not to
changing the privatization policy after observing private firms’ entry). However, the commitment
not to change the privatization policy over time is difficult (Sato and Matsumura, 2018). There-
fore, the entry-then-privatization model is more realistic when the government cannot commit to
maintaining the privatization policy.5
All of these studies assume increasing marginal costs. In the privatization-then-entry model, if
we assume constant marginal costs, either the public monopoly in which no private firm enters the
market, or the private oligopoly where only new entrants are active and the public (or privatized)
firm’s output is zero appear in equilibrium. In other words, there is no room to discuss mixed
oligopolies under the assumption of constant marginal costs in the privatization-then-entry model.
4White (1996) shows this theorem in his duopoly model.
5In the JT case, the Japanese government committed to holding a two-thirds share in JT until 2012 in its
legislation; however, the law changed to commit to a one-third holding. The public ownership shares often changed
over time. The Japanese government continued to sell shares in NTT, which was a state-owned public monopolist
until 1985, from 1986 to 2016. In 2015, the Japanese government sold a minor share in the Japan Postal Bank, the
largest bank in Japan, and Kampo, a major life insurance company. The French government increased its ownership
in Renault from 15% to 19.4% in 2015.
4
However, this is not true in the entry-then-privatization model.
In this study, we investigate a free entry mixed market with constant marginal costs. We show
that even under the condition that the privatization-then-entry model yields a public monopoly, the
entry-then-privatization yields multiple equilibria. Both full privatization and full nationalization
appear as locally stable equilibria, and the former yields the lowest level of welfare among all (equi-
librium and non-equilibrium) privatization policies. This result suggests that a non-committed
flexible privatization policy may yield destructive results.
Our multiple equilibrium result is in sharp contrast to the studies mentioned above, because
their models include a unique equilibrium. Our result implies that if private firms expect that
the government will fully privatize (nationalize) public firms, private firms enter (do not enter)
the market, and after observing private firms’ entering (not entering), the government in fact fully
privatizes (nationalizes) public firms. Therefore, both situations are self-fulfilling.
2 The Model
We consider a mixed oligopoly model in which one public firm (firm 0) competes with n private
firms (firms 1, 2,...,n). These firms produce homogeneous products for which the inverse demand
function is
p(Q) = a−Q,
where p denotes price, a is a positive constant, and Q :=
∑n
i=0 qi is the total output. We assume
that all private firms have an identical cost function and marginal costs are constant. Let c0 be
firm 0’s marginal cost and c be the private firm’s marginal cost. We assume that c < c0; that is,
the public firm is less efficient than the private firm.6 Let qi be firm i’s output. When the private
firm enters the market, it incurs an entry cost of F .
6The assumptions of linear demand and constant marginal costs with the cost disadvantage for a public firm over
private firms is popular in the literature on mixed oligopolies. See Pal (1998), Capuano and De Feo (2010), and
Matsumura and Ogawa (2010). For a discussion on the endogenous cost disadvantage of public firms, see Matsumura
and Matsushima (2004). If c ≥ c0, no private firm enters the market in equilibrium.
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The social surplus W is
W =
∫ Q
0
p(q)dq − pQ+
n∑
i=0
pii =
∫ Q
0
p(q)dq − c0q0 −
n∑
i=1
cqi − nF.
Following Matsumura (1998), the public firm’s objective Ω is a convex-combination of social surplus
and their own profit, Ω = αpi0 + (1 − α)W . α ∈ [0, 1] represents the degree of privatization. In
the case of full nationalization (i.e., α = 0), firm 0 maximizes social welfare. In the case of full
privatization (i.e., α = 1), firm 0 maximizes its profit. Each private firm’s objective is its profit.
The complete information game runs as follows. In the first stage, each firm chooses whether
to enter the market. In the second stage, after observing n, the government chooses the degree of
privatization α to maximize social surplus. In the third stage, each firm simultaneously chooses its
output to maximize its objective. We solve this game by backward induction and the equilibrium
concept is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Throughout this study, we assume that c0 < c +
√
F . Otherwise, q0 = 0 in equilibrium,
regardless of α, and thus, any α is optimal (because α never affects equilibrium outcomes).
3 Equilibrium
First, we solve the third stage game given α. The first order-condition for each private firm is
p+ p′q − c = 0. (1)
The second-order condition is satisfied.
If n ≥ n˜ := (a − c0)/(c0 − c), the solution to the third stage game is corner. That is, q0 = 0
regardless of α, and the equilibrium outcome is characterized as a private oligopoly. The output
of each private firm is (a − c)/(n + 1) and the equilibrium price is (a + nc)/(n + 1). Note that
n ≥ n˜ implies (a+ nc)/(n+1) ≤ c0. In this case, any degree of privatization is optimal because α
does not affect welfare. Henceforth, we restrict our attention to the case in which n < n˜. We can
show that n < n˜ in the free-entry equilibrium assuming c0 < c+
√
F .
If n ∈ (0, n˜), the solution is interior. The first-order condition of the public firms is
p+ αp′q0 − c0 = 0. (2)
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The second-order condition is satisfied. These first-order conditions yield the following equilibrium
quantities for the public and private firms in the third stage (given α and n)
qT0 (α) =
a− (n+ 1)c0 + nc
1 + (n+ 1)α
, (3)
qT (α) =
α(a− c) + c0 − c
1 + (n+ 1)α
, (4)
respectively (the superscript T indicates the third-stage subgame).
We obtain the following equilibrium total output, price, private firms’ profit, and welfare:
QT (α) =
n(a− c)α+ a− c0
1 + (n+ 1)α
, (5)
pT (α) =
(a+ nc)α+ c0
1 + (n+ 1)α
, (6)
piT (α) =
(
α(a− c) + c0 − c
1 + (n+ 1)α
)2
− F, (7)
W T (α) =
X1
2(1 + (n+ 1)α)2
− nF, (8)
respectively, where X1 := (a− c0 +αn(a− c))2 +2α(a− (n+1)c0 + nc)2 +2n(α(a− c) + c0 − c)2.
Next, we discuss the government’s welfare maximization problem in the second stage. Let αS
be the equilibrium degree of privatization (the superscript S indicates the second-stage subgame).
Let f(n) := n(c0 − c) − a + (n + 1)2c0 − (n + 2)nc = (c0 − c)n2 + 3(c0 − c)n − a + c0. Because
f(0) < 0, we obtain f(n) = 0 has one positive and one negative solution. Let n∗ be the positive
solution to f(n) = 0. Because f(n˜) > 0, we obtain n˜ > n∗.
Lemma 1 (i) If n < n∗, αS = α∗, where
α∗ :=
n(c0 − c)
a− (n+ 1)2c0 + n(n+ 2)c .
(ii) If n ∈ [n∗, n˜), αS = 1. (iii) α∗ is increasing in n. (iv) α∗ is decreasing in c and increasing in
c0.
Proof See the Appendix.
Lemma 1 (i,ii) implies that αS > 0, unless n = 0. Matsumura (1998) shows this for duopolies
and Matsumura and Kanda (2005) shows this for oligopolies. Matsumura and Okamura (2015)
demonstrate Lemma 1 (iii).
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Lemma 1 (iv) states that as long as αS < 1 (i.e., full privatization is not optimal), the optimal
degree of privatization is decreasing with the cost of each private firm. An increase of the degree
of privatization makes firm 0 less aggressive because it is less concerned with consumer surplus.
Through the strategic interaction, firm 0’s less aggressive behavior makes the private firms more
aggressive. In other words, production substitution from the public firm to the private firms takes
place. Because the marginal cost of the public firm is higher than that of each private firm,
this production substitution improves welfare (welfare-improving effect).7 However, because the
total output is decreasing in α, an increase in the degree of privatization reduces welfare (welfare-
reducing effect). This trade-off determines the optimal degree of privatization. The higher (lower)
c0 (c) is, the stronger is the abovementioned welfare improving effect of production substitution.
Therefore, the optimal degree of privatization is increasing in c0 and decreasing in c.
Let piS(n) be the equilibrium profit in the second-stage subgame in which n is given exogenously.
Suppose that the solution to the second stage is interior (i.e., αS < 1). By substituting α∗ into
piT (α), we obtain the following equilibrium profit of the private firms:
piS(n) = (n+ 1)2(c0 − c)2 − F. (9)
Suppose that αS = 1. By substituting α = 1 into piT (α), we obtain the following equilibrium
profit of private firms:
piS(n) =
(a+ c0 − 2c
n+ 2
)2 − F. (10)
We now present an important result that directly leads to our main result (Proposition 2).
Proposition 1 (i) If the optimal privatization policy is not full privatization (i.e., αS < 1), private
firm i’s profit is increasing in n. (ii) If the optimal privatization policy is full privatization (i.e.,
αS = 1), private firm i’s profit is decreasing in n.
Proof See the Appendix.
Proposition 1 (ii) is intuitive. Thus, we explain the intuition behind Proposition 1 (i). An
increase in n increases each private firm’s profit as long as the solution is interior. An increase in n
7For an excellent discussion on welfare-improving production substitution, see Lahiri and Ono (1988).
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strengthens the welfare-improving effect of production substitution from the public firm (firm 0) to
private firms. Therefore, an increase in n strengthens the increases in the degree of privatization,
which makes the public firm less aggressive and raises each private firm’s profit.8
Because piS(n) is increasing for n ∈ [0, n∗) and decreasing for n ≥ n∗, piS(n) has an inverted
U-shape.9
We now discuss the first stage. Let the superscript F denote the equilibrium outcome in the
full game starting at the first stage. Each private firm enters the market as long as the profit is
non-negative. Therefore, as long as n > 0,
(p− c)q − F = 0. (11)
From (9) and the assumption c0 < c +
√
F , we obtain limn→0 piS(n) = (c0 − c)2 − F < 0.
Because piS(n) is increasing for n < n∗, piS(n) is decreasing for n > n∗, and piS(n˜) < 0, there are
three equilibria, two of which are locally stable (See Figure 1). In one stable equilibrium α = 0
(and n = 0), and in the other stable equilibrium, α = 1. These lead to the following proposition.
Proposition 2 There are two locally stable equilibria. In one equilibrium, the degree of privatiza-
tion is zero (full nationalization) and no private firm enters the market. In the other equilibrium,
the degree of privatization is one and the number of private firms is strictly positive.
Proposition 2 states that as long as n > 0 in equilibrium, the equilibrium degree of privatization
is one.
8Matsumura and Sunada (2013) investigate a mixed oligopoly with misleading advertising competition. They
show that the new entry of a private firm might increase the profits of incumbent private firms because it increases
(decreases) the public (private) firm’s advertising. Some studies on private oligopolies show that a new entry could
increase the incumbents’ profits. Mukherjee and Zhao (2009) consider an asymmetric Stackelberg setting in which
there are two incumbent firms (leader) with different marginal costs and a potential entrant (follower) with a higher
marginal cost. The authors then show that the existence of an inefficient follower can increase the profit of the more
efficient leader. Ishida et al. (2011) consider a model in which a dominant firm competes with minor firms and show
that an increase in the number of minor firms accelerates the dominant firm’s R&D and profit. Chen and Riordan
(2007) show that in a differentiated market, an increase in variety by a new entry might soften competition and
increase the incumbent firms’ profits. The driving force of our study thus differs from that in these studies.
9More precisely, an inverted V-shape. See Figure 1 below.
9
Figure 1: Multiple Equilibria
We now discuss the welfare implications. We consider the scenario where α is given exogenously
as a benchmark. In the first stage, each private firm chooses whether to enter the market given α.
In the second stage, firms face Cournot competition. Let nB(α) and WB(α) be the equilibrium
number of entering private firms and the welfare of this benchmark case, respectively. We obtain
nB =

a− (c+√F )√
F
− c+
√
F − c0
α
√
F
if (1 + α)(c+
√
F )− αa < c0 < c+
√
F (12a)
0 if c0 ≤ (1 + α)(c+
√
F )− αa (12b)
and
WB =

(c+
√
F − c0)2
α
+
(a− c−√F )2
2
if (1 + α)(c+
√
F )− αa < c0 < c+
√
F (13a)
(1 + 2α)(a− c0)2
2(1 + α)2
if c0 ≤ (1 + α)(c+
√
F )− αa (13b)
From these, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 3 WB is non-increasing in α and strictly decreasing in α if nB > 0 or α > 0.
Proof See the Appendix.
Proposition 3 states that the full privatization equilibrium in Proposition 2 minimizes the
resulting welfare. In other words, full privatization is the worst privatization policy for welfare;
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nevertheless, it is an equilibrium policy. This result suggests that a government may choose the
worst privatization policy if it chooses the policy after private firms enter the market. Note that
WB(α) =WF if α is equal to the equilibrium degree of privatization in the entry-then-privatization
model.
4 Concluding remarks
In this study, we investigate a free-entry mixed oligopoly with constant marginal costs. Although
constant marginal cost models are very popular in mixed oligopolies, discussions of such models in
the literature are rare. We adopt the Lee et al.’s (2018) time line and show that multiple equilibria
exist, and that both full nationalization and full privatization constitute equilibrium policies. We
also show that full privatization is the worst privatization policy for welfare among all possible
privatization policies (whether it is an equilibrium policy or not).
In this study, we assume that private firms are domestic. The literature on mixed oligopolies
demonstrates that the nationality of the private firms often affects the behavior of a public firm
and the optimal privatization policy. Extending our analysis in this direction is difficult work and
remains for future research.10
10Whether the private firm is domestic or foreign often yields contrasting results in the literature on mixed
oligopolies. See Corneo and Jeanne (1994), Fjell and Pal (1996), Pal and White (1998), and Ba´rcena-Ruiz and
Garzo´n (2005a, 2005b). The optimal degree of privatization is decreasing with the foreign ownership rate in private
firms when the number of private firms is given exogenously (Lin and Matsumura, 2012), while it is increasing with
the foreign ownership rate in private firms in free-entry markets (Cato and Matsumura, 2012).
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
From (8), we obtain
∂W T
∂α
= −
(
a− (n+ 1)c0 + nc
)(
α(a− (n+ 1)2c0 + n(n+ 2)c)− n(c0 − c)
)(
1 + (n+ 1)α
)3 . (14)
When n ∈ [n∗, n˜), a − (n + 1)c0 + nc > 0 and α(a − (n + 1)2c0 + n(n + 2)c) − n(c0 − c) < 0 for
α < 1. Thus, (14) > 0. This implies Lemma 1 (ii).
Suppose that n < n∗. By solving ∂W T /∂α = 0 with respect to α, we obtain
α∗ =
n(c0 − c)
a− (n+ 1)2c0 + n(n+ 2)c . (15)
The second-order condition
−(a− (n+ 1)
2c0 + n(n+ 2)c)
4
(a− (n+ 1)c0 + nc)2 < 0
is satisfied. Therefore, the optimal degree of privatization is α∗. Note that α∗ < 1 if n < n∗. This
implies Lemma 1 (i).
From (15), we obtain
∂α∗
∂n
=
(c0 − c)
(
a− c0 + n2(c0 − c)
)
(a− (n+ 1)2c0 + n(n+ 2)c)2 > 0,
∂α∗
∂c
= −a− (n+ 1)
2c0 + n(n+ 2)c+ n
2(n+ 2)(c0 − c)
(a− (n+ 1)2c0 + n(n+ 2)c)2 < 0,
∂α∗
∂c0
=
n(a− (n+ 1)2c0 + n(n+ 2)c) + n(n+ 1)2(c0 − c)
(a− (n+ 1)2c0 + n(n+ 2)c)2 > 0.
These imply Lemma 1 (iii,iv). ■
Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose that the solution to the second stage is interior (i.e., αS < 1). From (9), we obtain
∂piS(n)
∂n
= 2(n+ 1)(c0 − c)2 > 0.
This result implies Proposition 1 (i).
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Suppose that αS = 1. From (10), we obtain
∂piS(n)
∂n
= −2(a+ c0 − 2c)
2
(n+ 2)3
< 0.
This result implies Proposition 1 (ii). ■
Proof of Proposition 3
If (1 + α)(c +
√
F ) − αa < c0 < c +
√
F , then a mixed oligopoly appears in equilibrium (i.e.,
nB > 0). From (13a), we obtain
∂WB
∂α
= −
(
c+
√
F − c0
α
)2
< 0.
Note that if α = 0, (1 + α)(c+
√
F )− αa < c0 < c+
√
F is never satisfied.
If c0 < (1 + α)(c+
√
F )− αa, a public monopoly appears in equilibrium (i.e., nB = 0). From
(13b), we obtain
∂WB
∂α
= −α
(
a− c0
)2
(1 + α)3
≤ 0.
The strict inequality in this equation holds if and only if α > 0. These imply Proposition 3 (ii).
■
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